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CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE: USING AN
ANCIENT DOCTRINE TO ADAPT TO
RISING SEA LEVELS IN SAN
FRANCISCO BAY
TIM EICHENBERG, SEAN BOTHWELL** & DARCY VAUGHN***

I.

INTRODUCTION

A little-known artifact of the California Gold Rush was the filling of
San Francisco Bay. Thousands of forty-niners steamed around Cape
Horn and swarmed ashore in Yerba Buena Cove, abandoning their
vessels in San Francisco‘s idyllic harbor to seek gold in the Sierra
foothills.
Yerba Buena Cove became a forest of masts. Hundreds of hulks lay
abandoned. Some of them were used as warehouses, offices, or public
buildings. One became the city jail. Around others the land was filled
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in, and they became a permanent part of the city. . . . Eventually the
1
cove was completely filled in.

Soon, the flood of fortune-seekers spread across San Francisco Bay.
Towns like Oakland and Sausalito sprang up overnight, and the filling of
San Francisco Bay began in earnest. By 1960, one- third of the Bay had
been filled, and a plan was devised to reduce the Bay to a mere river.2 To
three dynamic women from Berkeley this was the final straw.3 They
created a new organization called ―Save the Bay‖ and in 1965
successfully lobbied for legislation that created the nation‘s first coastal
management agency – the San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Development Commission (BCDC) – with its chief mission to prohibit
Bay fill and provide for public access.
By all accounts, BCDC and its local, state and federal partners have
been remarkably successful at reducing Bay fill and restoring Bay
habitat. Prior to 1965, about 2,300 acres of San Francisco Bay were filled
each year.4 Today, just a few acres are filled annually, and only for
water-oriented uses, so that the Bay is more than 15,000 acres larger
today than it was when BCDC was established.5
But the Bay is currently confronted with another, even more
daunting problem: global climate change and sea level rise. A projected
sixteen- to fifty-five-inch rise in sea level during the next century
threatens 270,000 Bay Area residents and $62 billion worth of shoreline
development, including both international airports, Silicon Valley, much
of the freeway system, and the Bay‘s entire estuarine ecosystem.6
Since BCDC was created to stop the filling of the Bay, it is ill-

1

HAROLD GILLIAM, SAN FRANCISCO BAY 62 (1957).
Between 1850 and 1960 an average of four square miles of the Bay were filled each year,
reducing the open Bay from 787 square miles from the days of the Gold Rush to 430 square miles a
century later. RICE ODELL, THE SAVING OF SAN FRANCISCO BAY: A REPORT ON CITIZEN ACTION
AND REGIONAL PLANNING, THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION 8 (1972). Plans were proposed to fill
another 325 square miles, which would have reduced the Bay to little more than a broad river. SAN
FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, HISTORY OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY
CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, available at www.bcdc.ca.gov/history.shtml.
3
The three women were Mrs. Catherine Kerr, Mrs. Sylvia McLaughlin, and Mrs. Esther
Gullick. Mrs. Kerr‘s husband, Clark Kerr, was the president of the University of California. ODELL,
supra note 2, at 10-11.
4
SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, BCDC‘S MISSION,
www.bcdc.ca.gov/mission.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2009).
5
Id.; see also SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, 2009 ANNUAL
STATISTICS (2009) (on file with authors).
6
SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, LIVING WITH A RISING BAY:
VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION IN SAN FRANCISCO BAY AND ON THE SHORELINE, DRAFT STAFF
REPORT 59 (2009), available at www.bcdc.ca.gov/proposed_bay_plan/bp_1-08_cc_draft.pdf.
2
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equipped to address the modern challenges presented by a bay expanding
from rising sea levels and climate change. Moreover, recent judicial
interpretations extending the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution – the so-called ―Takings Clause‖ – to environmental and
land-use regulations further restricts the ability of BCDC and other
government agencies to mitigate the impacts of climate change and sea
level rise.7
However, BCDC and other state coastal management agencies have
at their disposal an ancient tool: the ―public trust doctrine.‖ Dating back
to Roman times, the public trust doctrine establishes a ―public easement‖
over navigable waters and tidelands that can be used to help address
modern challenges presented by rising sea levels caused by a warming
climate.
The predicament faced in San Francisco Bay is confronted in bays
and estuaries throughout the nation. Using BCDC as a case study, this
Article examines the threats posed by climate change to San Francisco
Bay, the relationship between the public trust doctrine and the Takings
Clause, and how the public trust doctrine can help public agencies
address the impacts of climate change and sea level rise by:
 Enhancing limited permit authority;
 Requiring fees to mitigate the impacts of climate change;
 Addressing the impacts of shoreline armoring;
 Utilizing rolling easements and other legal mechanisms;
 Protecting wetlands, marshes, and salt ponds;
 Implementing the California Environmental Quality Act and
Coastal Zone Management Act; and
 Pursuing common law remedies to preserve open space and
public access.
II.

THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON COASTAL COMMUNITIES
AND SAN FRANCISCO BAY

The impacts of climate change on San Francisco Bay during the
next 100 years will dramatically change the Bay‘s uses, boundaries,
ecosystem, and infrastructure. The California Climate Change Center
projects that by 2100, average temperatures in California could rise
between three and 10.5 degrees Fahrenheit,8 raising water levels in the

7

―Takings‖ jurisprudence will be discussed at length throughout this Article.
CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT BIENNIAL REPORT 1.5
(2009), available at www.energy.ca.gov/2009publications/CAT-1000-2009-003/CAT-1000-2009003-D.PDF.
8
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Bay as much as fifty-five inches, and drastically changing the Bay‘s
shoreline.9 BCDC has shown how a one-meter rise in the level of the Bay
will inundate 200 square miles of low-lying shoreline areas, including
some of the region‘s most valuable infrastructure and economic centers
such as San Francisco and Oakland International Airports, portions of
Silicon Valley, and much of the area between Richmond and San
Pablo.10 The far north and south ends of the Bay, the South Bay, San
Pablo Bay, and the area surrounding the mouth of the Petaluma River are
particularly vulnerable to flooding.11
The combination of higher baseline mean sea level, changes in river
flows, and weather effects may increase the frequency and duration of
high sea level extremes. Extreme sea levels and storm surge will threaten
existing flood-control structures and prompt some property owners to
construct larger and more structurally sound levees and sea walls. In the
past, maintaining and expanding the existing system of flood-control
structures has come at the expense of the Bay‘s shoreline ecosystems.
BCDC analysis shows that much existing public access to and along the
shoreline is likely to flood by the year 2050.12 The construction of
seawalls and other erosion-control devices to protect existing
development and low-lying areas may further exacerbate impacts on
public access and unprotected areas of the Bay.13
This is not just a problem for the Bay Area. Many coastal
communities will be faced with utilizing expensive and potentially
damaging erosion and flood-control methods to combat sea level rise.
Studies have shown that such methods may actually increase risks of
erosion and dynamic coastal process, and also may generate a false sense
of security that fosters development in flood-prone areas.14 In California
alone, the cost of building static structures to protect against a fifty-fiveinch rise in sea level would be $14 billion.15 A sea level rise of fifty-five
inches will inundate more than 25% of California‘s remaining 550 square
miles of valuable wetlands.16 By 2060, coastal erosion nationwide may
9

Id. at 1.10.
See SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, supra note 6, at 59.
11
See id. at 60, 82.
12
Id. at 18.
13
See Meg Caldwell & Craig Holt Segall, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level Rise, Ecosystem
Loss, and Public Access Along the California Coast, 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 533, 539-42 (2007).
14
Adam Parris & Leslie Lacko, Climate Change Adaptation in the San Francisco Bay: A
Case for Managed Realignment, 77 SHORE & BEACH 46, 48 (2009).
15
Id.
16
Brief for Coastal States Organization as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25,
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., No 08-1151 (Oct. 5, 2009) 2009
WL 6046172, available at www.coastalstates.org/uploads/CSO%20Amicus%20Brief_STBR_0810
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threaten nearly 87,000 homes and other buildings.17 Even a twenty-inch
rise in sea levels may cause an estimated $23-170 billion in damage
nationally by 2100 from increased storm intensity and frequency.18 Rapid
erosion and increased coastal and inland flooding will have disastrous
effects on beach habitats, wetlands, and coastal forests.19
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine dates back to Roman times and the Code
of Justinian, which proclaimed that ―the shores are not understood to be
property of any man.‖20 The doctrine was imported to the American
colonies from England, where navigable waters and underlying tidelands
and submerged lands were owned by the Crown but remained subject to
the public‘s right to use such lands and waters for fishing, navigation,
and commerce.21
The doctrine remained imbedded in American common law when
the colonies declared their independence. Each state acquired ownership
of the navigable waters, including the tidelands and submerged lands
within its jurisdiction, when it joined the Union,22 and developed its own
public trust doctrine and public trust uses.23 Today the doctrine creates a
duty for states to protect the common heritage of their coastal lands and
waters for preservation and public use.24 In effect, it establishes a ―public

115.pdf (―In California . . . [a]n estimated 550 square miles, or 350,000 acres, of wetlands exist
along the California coast, valued at approximately $5,000-$200,000 per acre. A sea level rise of 1.4
meters (55 inches), will flood approximately 150 square miles of land immediately adjacent to
current wetlands.‖) (footnote omitted).
17
Id. at 20.
18
Id. at 24.
19
Id. at 24-25.
20
J. INST. 2.1.5 (THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, Thomas Collett Sanders trans. 158 (1876),
citing Institutes of Justinian 2.1.5 (AD 533). Section 2.1.1 of the code also states that, ―[b]y the law
of nature these things are common to all mankind – the air, running water, the sea and consequently
the shores of the sea. No one, therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he
respects habitations, monuments and the buildings, which are not, like the sea, subject only to the
law of nations.‖ Id. 2.1.1.
21
Jack H. Archer & Terrance W. Stone, The Interaction of the Public Trust and the
“Takings” Doctrines: Protecting Wetlands and Critical Coastal Areas, 20 VT. L. REV. 81, 83-84
(1995). In the United States, the state holds title as trustee of the public trust in place of the Crown.
Id.
22
Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15-16 (1935).
23
STEPHEN E. ROADY, The Public Trust Doctrine, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND
POLICY 39, 41 (Donald C. Baur, Tim Eichenberg & Michael Sutton eds. 2008).
24
Nat‘l Audubon Soc‘ty v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983);
see also State v. Superior Ct. (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 231 (Cal. 1981); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d
374, 381 (Cal. 1971). Persuasive arguments also have been made that a federal public trust doctrine
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easement‖ held by the state over tidelands and submerged lands,
including those lands transferred to private ownership (unless the trust
has been specifically terminated by legislation). Accordingly, even where
it no longer has an ownership interest, the state has a duty to protect
public uses.25
A.

GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE

The geographic scope of the public trust doctrine traditionally
extends to lands under ―navigable waters,‖ including rivers, streams, and
lakes, as well as submerged lands and tidelands.26 Submerged lands
include all navigable riverbeds and lakebeds up to the ordinary low water
mark, and lands underlying state ocean and estuarine waters. Tidelands
include all areas subject to tidal influence up to the ordinary high water
mark, as measured by the mean high tide line. The mean high tide line is
determined by averaging the height of the all tides over an 18.6-year
period reflecting the time it takes for the moon to complete a cycle
during which its distance from the earth and sun varies.27 In California,
the public trust doctrine applies up to the mean high tide line. This stands
in stark contrast to so-called ―low tide‖ states where the sea boundary of
privately owned oceanfront property is the mean low tide line, and public
access in the intertidal zone is not considered a public trust right.28 On
should exercise the same fiduciary responsibilities beyond state waters in the United States
Exclusive Economic Zone. See Mary Turnipseed, Stephen E. Roady, Raphael Sagarin &, Larry B.
Crowder, The Silver Anniversary of the United States’ Exclusive Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years
of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of a Blue Water Public Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.
Q. 1, 40-50 (2009); ROADY, supra note 23, at 41.
25
See SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, SAN FRANCISCO BAY PLAN
79 (2008), available at www.bcdc.ca.gov/pdf/planning/plans/bayplan/bayplan.pdf.
26
All tidelands subject to the ebb and flow of the tide are subject to the public trust doctrine
regardless of whether the waters are navigable-in-fact. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484
U.S. 469, 481 (1988).
27
Borax Consol., 296 U.S. at 23-24; People v. William Kent Estate Co., 51 Cal. Rptr. 215,
218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (―The ‗high water mark‘ is not ‗a physical mark made upon the ground by
the waters; it means the line of high water as determined by the course of the tides‘. . . . The ebb and
flow of the tide, and the varying heights of the several tides, are largely caused by the gravity forces
of moon and sun, the former exercising about double the effect of the latter. The varying positions of
these two bodies, in relation to each other and to the particular point of the earth‘s surface being
considered, effect substantial differences in the height of the several high tides. The most commonly
recognized variations follow the phases of the moon. But the lunar month is not a sufficient period to
determine an average of high tides. Rather, the full range of astronomical variants affecting the
height of tides is deemed covered only in 18.6 years.‖).
28
Five states allow private ownership to the mean low water mark: Maine, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Delaware and Virginia. In these states the trust applies below the mean low water
line. Barbara A. Vestal, Dueling with Boat Oars, Dragging Through Mooring Lines: Time for More
Formal Resolution of Use Conflicts in States’ Coastal Waters?, 4 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 26 n.87
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the other hand, Texas asserts public trust rights beyond the mean high
tide line to the first line of natural vegetation.29 Areas landward of mean
high tide are generally excluded from the public trust unless necessary to
protect trust uses and resources.30
In California, the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine
extends to non-navigable tributaries of navigable waterways31 to debris
fills impairing navigation and other uses of navigable waters,32 and to
substantial diversions of non-navigable waters that feed navigable
streams.33 However, the public trust does not apply to tidelands perfected
by federal patents pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which
formally ended the Mexican-American war in 1848, because California
failed to assert its public easement during the patent confirmation
proceedings.34 Though no case law speaks to patented inland parcels,
California may also be precluded from asserting the public trust over
nine million acres of patented lands.35
B.

PUBLIC TRUST USES

The public trust doctrine generally guarantees public rights to
navigable waters, tidelands, and submerged lands for traditional uses of
fishing, navigation, and commerce.36 The California Constitution also
(1999); see also Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 176-77 (Me. 1989); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 569-70 (Mass. 1974).
29
TEX. NAT. RES. § 61.018 (a-1)(2),(3) (Westlaw 2010). See infra notes 195-204 and
accompanying text for discussion of rolling easements.
30
See Nat‘l Audubon Soc‘ty v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal.
1983).
31
Id. at 721.
32
See People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138, 147 (Cal. 1884). The fills at
issue in that case were waste products from the use of water cannons to wash gold ore from hillsides,
which dumped 600,000 cubic yards of sand and gravel annually into the north fork of the American
River. Id. at 144.
33
See People ex rel. Roberts v. Russ, 132 Cal. 102, 106 (Cal. 1901).
34
See Summa Corp. v. California, 466 U.S. 198, 202, 209 (1984). Though a federal patent
could not dispense with a state‘s sovereign rights, the deeds of Spanish and Mexican grantees were
patented ―pursuant to the authority reserved to the United States to enable it to discharge its
international duty with respect to land which, although tideland, had not passed to the State.‖ Id. at
205. Patent proceedings focusing on Spanish and Mexican law and custom might arguably attach a
public trust easement to title, as public trust rights under Spanish and subsequently Mexican law,
guaranteed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, serve as an independent basis for the public trust
doctrine in California. Nat‘l Audubon Soc‘y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 719
n.15 (Cal. 1983).
35
Summa Corp., 466 U.S. at 209; see also Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest:
Property Rights, Indian Treaties and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 26 N.M. L. REV. 201, 218
(1996).
36
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988).
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guarantees basic trust rights of public access to navigable waters37 and
the right to fish on and from public lands and waters.38 In addition,
California courts have long recognized that trust uses on tidelands are
sufficiently flexible to evolve over time based upon ―changing public
needs,‖ and that ―in administering the trust the state is not burdened with
an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization over
another.‖39
Consequently, the trust in California extends to recreational uses
such as the right to use navigable waters ―to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to
use for boating and general recreation purposes . . . and to use the bottom
of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes.‖40
More significantly, the courts have defined the public trust doctrine to
include ―the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that
they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and
as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine
life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.‖41 A
recent California ruling also found that the public could enforce the trust
to protect birds and wildlife threatened by wind turbines at Altamont
Pass, even though they were not located on tidelands or submerged
lands.42 The trust can even prevent uses on non-trust lands and non37

CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 (―No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or
possessing the frontage or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in this
State, shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required for any
public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of such water; and the Legislature shall
enact such laws as will give the most liberal construction to this provision, so that access to the
navigable waters of this State shall be always attainable for the people thereof.‖) Based upon this
provision, a county ordinance was invalidated that prohibited rafting on the South Fork of the
American River ―because it denies the constitutional right of the public use and access to a navigable
stream.‖ People v. El Dorado County, 96 Cal. App. 3d 403, 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). The California
Legislature has also enacted numerous statutes to provide such access (E.g., CAL. GOV. CODE §§
66602, 66632.4 (Westlaw 2010) (McAteer-Petris Act); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30210-30212
(Westlaw 2010) (California Coastal Act); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 31400-31405 (Westlaw 2010)
(authorizing California Coastal Conservancy to acquire, develop and operate coastal access-ways).
38
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 25 (―The people shall have the right to fish upon and from the public
lands of the State and in the waters thereof, . . . and no land owned by the State shall ever be sold or
transferred without reserving in the people the absolute right to fish thereupon . . . ‖).
39
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
40
Id. at 380; see also People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1045 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1971) (―With our ever- increasing population, its ever-increasing leisure time . . . …and the
ever- increasing need for recreational areas (witness the hundreds of camper vehicles carrying
people to areas where boating, fishing, swimming and other water sports are available), it is
extremely important that the public need not be denied use of recreational water . . . . [t]he rule is
that a navigable stream may be used by the public for boating, swimming, fishing, hunting and all
recreational purposes.‖).
41
Whitney, 491 P.2d at 380 (emphasis added).
42
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 595-96 (Cal.
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navigable waters that harm navigable waters (e.g., diverting nonnavigable waters that harm Mono Lake).43
Thus, the public trust doctrine has evolved from permitting certain
uses to protecting trust values44 and therefore may support affirmative
action to prevent harm to public trust lands and waters in a manner
similar to abating a public nuisance.45
C.

CONVEYING PUBLIC TRUST LANDS

The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that states have the
exclusive right to hold tidelands and submerged lands in trust for public
benefit.46 Although states may convey portions of such lands to public or
private entities for trust purposes such as improving waterways by
constructing ports, docks and wharves, the conveyance may not
substantially impair public trust rights, and the lands conveyed generally
remain subject to a public trust easement.47
Conveyances that pass title to trust property do not extinguish trust
rights or the public easement unless the trustee determines that the lands
are no longer suitable for trust purposes.48 When private owners receive
title to trust lands, they do so subject to the paramount power of the state
to exercise the public trust.49 Therefore, public trust rights generally
persist on privately owned trust lands and may be asserted by the state or
Ct. App. 2008). However, the court held that members of the public could enforce the trust against
the government, not the private companies operating the windmills. Id. at 607. Only the government
as trustee could enforce the trust against private parties. Id.
43
See Nat‘l Audubon Soc‘ty v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 711-12 (Cal.
1983).
44
Archer & Stone, supra note 21, at 91. Thus, the state as administrator and controller of the
public trust has the right ―to enter upon and possess the same for the preservation and advancement
of the public uses and to make such changes and improvements as may be deemed advisable for
those purposes.‖ People v. Cal. Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 599 (Cal. 1913).
45
Archer & Stone, supra note 21, at 93.
46
Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (―[T]he state holds title to soils under
tide water, by the common law . . . and that title necessarily carries with it control over the waters
above them, whenever the lands are subjected to use . . .‖).
47
Id. at 453-54. (―The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole
people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, . . . than it can abdicate its police
powers.‖). The waters of the state are also a public trust resource that is held separately in trust by
the state for the benefit of the people. Id. at 456. The waters of the state are owned and controlled by
the state and cannot be privately owned, although a private individual may acquire a limited right to
the use of such waters only. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 102, 1001 (Westlaw 2010); Kidd v.
Laird, 15 Cal. 162, 180 (1860) (such use is heavily regulated by the State Water Resources Control
Board).
48
See Cal. Fish Co., 166 Cal. at 597.
49
Id. at 596. (the grantee of trust lands does not obtain absolute ownership but takes ―title to
the soil . . . subject to the public right of navigation.‖).
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its designated trustee.50
When California became a state in 1850, it assumed responsibility
over nearly four million acres of public trust lands and waters, including
San Francisco Bay.51 Shortly thereafter, the California Legislature
conveyed nearly half of the Bay and San Francisco waterfront to local
governments and private parties.52 Before this practice was curtailed,
some submerged lands were filled and improved, including the Financial
District of San Francisco, and were declared free of the public trust.53
But virtually all unfilled tidelands and submerged lands, and even some
filled tidelands, remain subject to the public trust.54

50

City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 521 (Cal. 1980).
Pollard‘s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222 (1845) (California assumed ownership of its
tidelands and submerged lands on equal footing with other states. The Equal Footing Doctrine
provides that that whenever a state enters the Union, ―such state shall be admitted . . . on an equal
footing with the original states in all respects whatever.‖).
52
SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, SAN FRANCISCO BAY
CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMM., SAN FRANCISCO BAY PLAN SUPPLEMENT 413-414
(January 1969) (―Not only has much of the Bay – perhaps as much as 22% -- been sold to private
buyers, but the remainder of the Bay is also divided in ownership. The State in the past has granted
about 23 % of the Bay to cities and counties, and now owns outright only about 50%. The
remaining 5% is owned by the federal government.‖). The McAteer-Petris Act amended the terms of
all existing legislative trust grants that conveyed tidelands and submerged lands to the following
local governments: Alameda, Albany, City and County of San Francisco, Benicia, Oakland, City of
San Mateo, County of San Mateo, Vallejo, Richmond, South San Francisco, Berkeley, Burlingame,
Emeryville, Pittsburg, Redwood City, Sausalito, Antioch, Mill Valley, County of Marin, County of
Sonoma, San Leandro, Peralta Junior College District, San Rafael, San Francisco Port District and
East Bay Regional Park District. See generally, CAL. GOV‘T. CODE § 66600, et. seq. (Westlaw
2010); see also People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Development Comm‘n v. Town of
Emeryville, 69 Cal. 2d 533, 543 (Cal. 1968) (many of these grants specifically enumerate the types
of uses that may be made of the granted lands by the grantees, but all are also subject to BCDC
jurisdiction under the McAteer-Petris Act).
53
City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 479 (Cal. 1970); see also Marks v.
Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971). These areas are generally filled former tidelands that no longer
provide benefits to the public. However, the filling of trust lands in and of itself does not terminate
the public trust. The Legislature must specifically terminate the trust. To prevent abuses from the
indiscriminate conveyance of tidelands shortly after statehood, article X, section 3, of the California
Constitution prohibited the sale of all tidelands within two miles of any incorporated city or city and
county. In 1909, the Legislature prohibited all tideland sales to private parities. CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 7991 (Westlaw 2010).
54
SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, supra note 25, at 79. The
McAteer-Petris Act makes legislatively granted tidelands in the Bay subject to BCDC jurisdiction.
Town of Emeryville, 69 Cal. 2d at 549. Courts have held that legislatively granted tidelands must be
used for statewide public purposes. See Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199, 211 (Cal.
1955); Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 415 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958). This would
support Commission efforts to address impacts from climate change and sea level rise.
51
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STEWARDSHIP OF THE PUBLIC TRUST IN SAN FRANCISCO BAY

States generally delegate the management of trust lands and waters
to a specific agency. In California, the Legislature has granted
stewardship of its public trust lands to the State Lands Commission,
which can lease and convey trust lands, but only for trust purposes.55
Uses inconsistent with the public trust (i.e., non-trust-related uses) are
generally those that do not require waterfront locations, like residential
and non-water-related commercial office uses.56
The management of trust lands and waters generally involves
monitoring the activities of grantees to ensure compliance with the terms
of the statutory grants under the public trust doctrine,57 acquiring and
condemning lands needed for access to navigable waters,58 exchanging
trust lands no longer useful for trust purposes,59 and purchasing lands
usable for trust purposes.60 Agencies like the California State Lands
Commission also can prevent activities on trust lands inconsistent with
trust needs, sue for ejectment, trespass, and damages,61 and allow trust
uses without compensating private property owners.62

55
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 6216, 6301 (Westlaw 2010). The State Lands Commission is not
the only state-designated trustee agency. The State Water Board has trustee authority over the state‘s
fresh water resources under CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 et seq. (Westlaw 2010), and the Department
of Fish and Game has trustee authority over the state‘s fish and wildlife resources under CAL. FISH &
G. CODE § 700 et seq. (Westlaw 2010). Other state agencies, such as the California Coastal
Commission, Department of Forestry and Regional Water Quality Control Boards, while not
designated state trustee agencies, exercise legislative common law trust powers. Moreover, every
other state agency has the duty to consider and protect public trust resources in the administration of
its statutory mandate. Donna Sheehan Fitzgerald, Extending Public Trust Duties to Vermont’s
Agencies: A Logical Interpretation of the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine, 19 VT. L. REV. 509,
530 (1995) (―[A]gencies have common law public trust duties despite the absence of an express
legislative delegation of such duties.‖).
56
State Lands Commission policy provides that ―[u]ses that are generally not permitted on
public trust lands are those that are not trust use related, do not serve a public purpose, and can be
located on non-waterfront property, such as residential and non-maritime related commercial and
office uses. While trust lands cannot generally be alienated from public ownership, uses of trust
lands can be carried out by public or private entities by lease from this Commission or a local agency
grantee. In some cases, such as some industrial leases, the public may be excluded from public trust
lands in order to accomplish a proper trust use.‖ California State Lands Commission, Public Trust
Policy for the California State Lands Commission 2, available at www.slc.ca.gov/policy_statements/
public_trust/public_trust_policy.pdf.
57
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6306 (Westlaw 2010).
58
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6210.9.
59
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6307(a)(5).
60
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 8610-8633.
61
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 6216.1, 6224.1, 6302.
62
See Newcomb v. City of Newport Beach, 7 Cal. 2d 393, 400-02 (Cal. 1936); Oakland v.
Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 163 (Cal. 1897) (state must pay for the use or removal of
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Agencies that manage state trust lands may share their public trust
responsibilities with other state agencies. In California, BCDC is
authorized to coordinate and implement trust uses in the Bay ―in the
state‘s capacity as trustee of the tidelands.‖63 BCDC does not have the
right to convey or lease trust lands; that authority remains with the
California State Lands Commission.64 But both BCDC and the State
Lands Commission share authority to limit public and private uses of
trust lands in San Francisco Bay.65
BCDC exercises its public trust responsibilities through its statutory
authority under the McAteer-Petris Act ―to issue or deny permits for any
proposed project that involves placing fill, extracting materials or making
any substantial change in use of water, land or structure within the area
of the commission‘s jurisdiction.‖66 The California State Lands
Commission is guided by BCDC‘s enabling laws, which require
―maximum feasible public access,‖67 ensure that the public benefits of
fill in the Bay clearly exceed public detriments,68 and preserve wateroriented uses.69 Similar trust authority is provided to BCDC in the Suisun
Marsh.70
BCDC has been charged with developing policies under the San
Francisco Bay Plan to implement its statutory authority under the
McAteer-Petris Act, and it may amend portions of the Bay Plan as
conditions warrant, so long as the changes are consistent with the Act.71
In exercising its authority under the Act and the Bay Plan, courts have
held, BCDC must err on the side of the public trust principles and
ecological quality.72
The Bay Plan calls upon the Commission to ensure that Bay fill is
lawful improvements on trust lands made in good faith); see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6312
(Westlaw 2010).
63
City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 531-32 (Cal. 1980).
64
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6301.
65
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6302.
66
CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66604 (Westlaw 2010).
67
CAL. GOV‘T CODE §§ 66602, 66632.4.
68
CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66605(a).
69
CAL. GOV‘T CODE §§ 66602, 66605, 66611.
70
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 29002 (Westlaw 2010) (Marsh preservation); § 29009 (public
use); § 29011 (public access); §§ 29113, § 29202 (Suisun Marsh Protection Plan); § 29506 (permit
authority).
71
CAL. GOV‘T CODE §§ 66651, 66652 (Westlaw 2010). BCDC also has developed policies
in the Suisun Marsh Protection Plan to implement the Suisun Marsh Preservation Act. See CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 29008 (Westlaw 2010).
72
See People ex. rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm‘n v. Town of
Emeryville, 69 Cal. 2d 533, 545-47 (Cal. 1968); see also Candlestick Properties., Inc. v. San
Francisco Bay Conservation & Development Comm‘n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
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consistent with public trust uses73 and that its actions are ―consistent with
the public trust needs for the area.‖74 The Bay Plan describes trust uses
―such as commerce, navigation, fisheries, wildlife habitat, recreation and
open space.‖75 However, as noted above, California courts have
recognized that trust uses also include ―the preservation of those lands in
their natural state . . . as open space, and as environments which provide
food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the
scenery and climate of the area.‖76 While these trust uses do not provide
any additional legal authority, they may be used in support of BCDC‘s
existing authority under the McAteer–Petris Act, the Bay Plan, and its
other laws and policies to protect public trust uses.77 These laws are
direct legislative expressions of the common law public trust doctrine,78
and BCDC exercises its trust responsibilities whenever it acts on a
permit, adopts a Bay Plan or Marsh Plan amendment, adopts a Special
Area Plan, or changes a regulation.
IV. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Government agencies may confront constitutional limitations on the
―taking‖ of private property when they seek to address the impacts of
climate change and rising sea levels by preserving vulnerable tidelands
or wetlands, restricting development in hazardous areas, or limiting
certain uses in and along water bodies like San Francisco Bay. However,
government actions asserting a public trust easement on trust lands
generally do not constitute a taking.
The Fifth Amendment‘s ―Takings Clause‖ provides that private
property may not be taken for public use without just compensation.79
The Takings Clause does not prohibit government from taking private
property; it requires that property owners be compensated for the value
of the property taken. According to the U. S. Supreme Court, the Takings
Clause ―was designed to bar Government from forcing some people
73

SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, supra note 25, at 75.
Id. at 79.
75
Id.
76
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
77
Informal Advice from California Department of Justice to Michael Wilmar, Executive
Director of San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, Apr. 28, 1982 at 26, 38.
78
SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, supra note 25, at 79.
79
U.S. CONST. amend. V (―No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.‖
(emphasis added). This provision is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. California has a similar provision in its state constitution,
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
74
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alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.‖80 Much has been written about the
Takings Clause, and a comprehensive review is not intended here except
as it relates to the public trust doctrine.
Government can take private property in a number of ways: by
direct appropriation, by physical occupation or invasion, or by
regulation.81 A taking by direct appropriation occurs when government
condemns property by eminent domain for a highway, public works
project, or other public purpose.82 In such cases the property owner must
be compensated.83 Government may also require or authorize property to
be physically occupied or invaded for a public purpose, such as causing
property to be flooded or allowing the installation of cable TV
equipment.84 Taking property by permanent physical occupation or
invasion is considered a ―per se‖ or categorical taking,85 and
compensation must be provided regardless of the economic impact or the
amount of property taken.86
A.

TOTAL TAKING

The Supreme Court has established a per se or categorical taking
rule when government regulation renders property essentially valueless.
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,87 South Carolina denied a
permit to build a residence seaward of a setback line on an eroding
beach. Since no alternative beneficial uses were viable on the property
and the property was essentially rendered valueless, the Court

80

Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 10 (Westlaw 2010).
82
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). In Kelo, the Supreme Court upheld
the use of eminent domain to take private property for economic redevelopment. Id. at 489. The
Court held that ―without exception, our cases have defined [public use] broadly, reflecting our
longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.‖ Id. at 480.
83
BCDC does not have condemnation authority and therefore cannot directly appropriate
private property. See Jonathan Smith & Alan Pendleton, San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Development Commission: Challenge and Response After 30 Years, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
269, 274-280 (1998) (discussing BCDC‘s jurisdiction and authority).
84
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 426-27 (1982).
85
A physical occupation is ―a permanent and exclusive occupation by the government that
destroys the owner‘s right to possession, use and disposal of . . . property.‖ Boise Cascade Corp. v.
United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
86
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg‘l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323
(2002) (A permanent physical occupation occurs ―when the government appropriates part of a
rooftop in order to provide cable TV access for apartment tenants [and] it is required to pay for that
share no matter how small.‖).
87
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
81
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determined that government action denied ―all economically beneficial
or productive use of land.‖88 This kind of total taking generally requires
compensation to the landowner unless the restrictions ―inhere in the title
itself‖ and in background principles of property law and nuisance (this
important exception is discussed further below).89 Subsequent Court
decisions have clarified that the availability of other beneficial uses on
the property, such as development on an upland portion of coastal
wetlands, would preclude a finding that there is a total taking.90
B.

REGULATORY TAKING

A taking is less clear however, when a permit or regulation reduces
allowable uses, diminishes private property values, or requires the owner
to provide a public benefit such as public access. State law sometimes
specifically prohibits an agency from issuing or denying a permit in a
manner that takes private property without just compensation.91
Nevertheless, takings issues may arise whenever an agency denies a
permit, imposes a permit condition, or otherwise restricts the use of
private property that would impede efforts to address the impacts of
climate change and sea level rise.
Not every permit or regulation that diminishes property values is a
regulatory taking. Indeed, the U. S. Supreme Court recognized that
―government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law.‖92 Even government regulations that require the
physical invasion or occupation of private property are not a taking if

88
Id. at 1015. The ruling is narrow and applies only ―in the extraordinary circumstance when
no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted‖ or the property is rendered
―valueless.‖ Id. at 1017, 1020.
89
Id. at 1029.
90
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630-01 (2001).
91
The McAteer-Petris Act states that ―[t]he Legislature hereby finds and declares that this
title is not intended, and shall not be construed, as authorizing the commission to exercise its power
to grant or deny a permit in a manner which will take or damage private property for public use,
without the payment of just compensation therefor.‖ CAL. GOV CODE § 66606 (Westlaw 2010). A
similar provision is contained in the Suisun Marsh Preservation Act. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 29013
(Westlaw 2010). However, no BCDC decision has ever been held to constitute a taking. See, e.g.,
Navajo Terminals, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation Comm‘n, 46 Cal. App. 3d 1 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1975) (holding that the adoption of a BCDC resolution ―fixing and establishing within the
shoreline band the boundaries of the water-oriented priority land uses‖ did not constitute a taking);
Candlestick Props., Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm‘n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557
(Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (holding BCDC‘s denial of property owners request to fill his land was not a
taking).
92
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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necessary to abate a threat to public health and safety, because no one
―has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise
harm others.‖93 However, the Court noted long ago: that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, ―if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.‖94 It then spent the next eighty years trying to
articulate a clear test to determine when a particular regulation goes ―too
far.‖
Until recently, the Court relied on ad hoc (some say confusing)
factual inquiries. 95 Much has been written on the efficacy of these tests,
but for this analysis we examine four tests: the ―total loss of all beneficial
use‖ test used in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the threefactor test used in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,
the ―essential nexus‖ test used in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, and the ―rough proportionality‖ test used in Dolan v. City
of Tigard.
C.

PENN CENTRAL FACTORS

In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,96 the
Supreme Court established the principal guidance for ―resolving
regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or
Lucas [total taking] rules.‖97 Although unable to fashion a ―set formula‖
for evaluating takings claims,98 the Court set forth three factors to
determine whether a taking occurs: the economic impact of the
regulation, the character of the government action, and the degree of
interference with the owner‘s ―reasonable investment-backed

93

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass‘n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20 (1987).
Id. at 508 (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)) (emphasis added).
95
The Court‘s recent ruling in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005), finding
that a Hawaii statute that limited the rent that oil companies charge dealers that lease companyowned service stations was not a taking, provides some much-needed clarity to takings
jurisprudence. The Court noted that regulatory takings exist when government requires an owner to
suffer a permanent physical invasion of property – however minor – or where regulations completely
deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use. Id. at 538. It then stated that, ―[o]utside these
two relatively narrow categories (and the special context of land-use exactions discussed below [e.g.,
in Nollan and Dolan]), regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set forth in Penn
Central. . . . Primary among those factors are ‗[t]he economic impact of the regulation . . . on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the government has interfered with distinct
investment-backed . . . expectations‘ . . . [and] . . . the ‗character of the governmental action . . . .‖
Id. at 538-39 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978)).
96
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U. S. 104 (1978).
97
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
98
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U. S. at 124.
94
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expectations.‖99 The economic impact of the regulation factor refers to
the Lucas ruling under which the elimination of all value of the property
will generally result in a taking.100 The character of the government
regulation factor examines whether the regulation is for a public
purpose.101 The reasonable investment-backed expectation factor
examines whether a buyer knows that that an existing law or regulation
prohibits or restricts development on the property when the land is
purchased.102 Thus, for example, an owner would normally not have
reasonable investment-backed expectations for filling tidelands for nontrust private residential or agricultural uses under the public trust
doctrine,103 and consequently prohibiting those uses generally would not
constitute a taking.104
The Court also fashioned two additional takings tests to be used
when development exactions or conditions require the dedication of land
for public uses: the ―essential nexus‖ test, and the ―rough
proportionality‖ test.
D.

ESSENTIAL NEXUS

In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,105 the Court ruled that
a taking occurred when the Coastal Commission required a property
owner to dedicate a public access easement along a private portion of the

99

Id.
The mere diminution in the value of property alone, or the denial of the highest and best
use or most profitable use of property, does not constitute a taking. See Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc.
v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,
405 (1915) (reduction in value from $800,000 to $60,000 was held not a taking); Florida Rock
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 901-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
101
See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. In Lingle, the Court concluded that the ―character of the
government action‖ factor in Penn Central examines whether a regulation ―amounts to a physical
invasion or instead merely affects property interests through ‗some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.‖ Id. The Court in Lingle also
essentially eliminated consideration of whether a regulation ―substantially advance[s] a legitimate
state interest‖ under the Takings Clause. Id. at 540. It concluded that this test ―prescribes an inquiry
in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test, and that it has no proper place in our takings
jurisprudence.‖ Id.
102
Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (―One who buys with
knowledge of a restraint assumes the risk of economic loss. In such a case, the owner presumably
paid a discounted price for the property. Compensating him for a taking would confer a windfall.‖)
(citations omitted).
103
Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1083-84 (Wash. 1987). Since tidelands are also
subject to the public trust doctrine, the owner would also lack sufficient property interest to claim a
taking. Id.
104
Archer & Stone, supra note 21, at 111.
105
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm‘n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
100
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beach behind his house as a permit condition for enlarging his home.106
Although providing and protecting public access was a legitimate public
purpose, the exaction was not sufficiently related to the project‘s stated
impacts – blocking ocean views.107 The public access easement therefore
lacked an ―essential nexus . . . between the condition and the original
purpose of the building restriction.‖108 Under Nollan, public access to or
along the Bay may be required as a permit condition to developing
private property so long as it addresses the adverse effects caused by the
project on public access. But without a ―nexus,‖ the exaction is a
taking.109
E.

ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY

In Dolan v. City of Tigard,110 the Court added to the Nollan
―essential nexus‖ test the requirement that an exaction must also be
―rough[ly] proportional . . . both in nature and extent to the impact of the
proposed development.‖111 In Dolan, the Court struck down the
dedication of a bike path as a permit condition to authorize the
construction of a hardware store.112 The Court found that although there
was a nexus between the increased traffic caused by the store and the
requirement for a bike path, the City did not establish the extent to which
the bike path would mitigate the increased traffic or show that it was
roughly proportional to the traffic impacts.113
Dolan therefore requires ―some sort of individualized
determination‖ that the dedication is ―roughly proportional‖ to the
impacts of the development.114 The Court noted that ―government may
not require a person to give up a constitutional right – here the right to
receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use – in
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where
the benefit has little or no relationship to the property.‖115
106

Id. at 827.
Id. at 828.
108
Id. at 837.
109
Id.
110
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374 (1994).
111
Id. at 391.
112
Id. at 377-78.
113
Id. at 395-96. The Court held that ―[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required, but
the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication for the
pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic
demand generated.‖ Id.
114
Id. at 391.
115
Id. at 385.
107
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―TAKINGS‖ AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

As noted above, the Takings Clause constrains government
regulations and permit actions on private property. However, actions on
public trust lands and waters are protected from takings claims in a
number of ways.
The state‘s public trust interest in tidelands and submerged lands is
a dominant property interest, whether the state owns tidelands and
submerged lands in fee, or has conveyed those lands to private parties
and retains a public trust easement.116 The retained public trust easement
protects government action from takings claims because the easement
establishes allowable uses on trust property and therefore the state cannot
take something it already owns. For example, the State of Washington‘s
denial of a permit to build homes on platforms and pilings in tidal waters
was held not a taking because the public trust doctrine precluded
residential shoreline development.117 The denial of a fill permit was
upheld in South Carolina because public trust tidelands ―effected a
restriction on [the owner‘s] property rights inherent in the ownership of
property bordering tidal water . . . [and] ownership rights do not include
the right to backfill or place bulkheads on public trust land and the State
need not compensate him for the denial of permits to do what he cannot
otherwise do.‖118 In California, dredging privately owned tidelands to
improve navigation was held not a taking because the city, as the state‘s
trustee, retained a public trust easement over patented tidelands that
enabled it ―to make improvements and changes in the administration of
this easement without the exercise of eminent domain.‖119 California
courts have also held that blocking access to private tidelands by
constructing a bridge is not a taking.120
Lucas also creates an exception to the takings doctrine where
―background principles‖ of nuisance and property law prohibit the uses
that the state regulates, even if the regulation leaves a property with no
beneficial uses. This is because the regulation or restriction ―inheres in
the title itself, [and] in the restrictions that background principles of the
State‘s law of property and nuisance already place upon land
116
See Newcomb v. City of Newport Beach, 7 Cal. 2d 393, 401-02 (Cal. 1936); People v. Cal.
Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 596-99 (Cal. 1913); Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 183
(Cal. 1897); Western Oil & Gas Ass‘n v. State Lands Comm‘n, 105 Cal. App. 3d 554, 566 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980).
117
Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002).
118
McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003).
119
City of Newport Beach, 7 Cal. 2d at 403.
120
See Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep‘t of Pub. Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 416 (Cal. 1967).
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ownership.‖121 As a background principle of state property law, the
public trust doctrine may result in the application of the Lucas exception.
This issue is being tested in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Florida Department of Environmental Protection, argued before the
United States Supreme Court in December, 2009.122 The case involves
the application of the Florida Beach and Shoreline Preservation Act,
enacted in 1965 to replenish sand on critically eroding beaches.123 The
Act requires the state to establish a permanent mean high tide line prior
to depositing new sand at public expense below the new line.124
A group of private beachfront property owners claimed that fixing
the mean high tide line took their common law property rights of
accretion and contact with the water.125 The Florida Supreme Court
upheld the state‘s action pursuant to the state‘s constitutional duty to
protect state beaches held in trust for the public from future storm
damage and erosion.126 It found that the Act did not substantially impair
the littoral property right to contact with the water because it specifically
preserved the right to access, views, boating, bathing and fishing.127 It
also found that the right to accretion under Florida common law is a
contingent right that appropriately balances public and private interests
under the Shoreline Preservation and Protection Act.128
The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to determine if
the Florida Supreme Court decision constituted a ―judicial taking‖ of
beachfront property rights. Aside from the novel issue of judicial takings
and the effect of such claims on the federal judiciary, the Court‘s
decision could profoundly affect a state‘s right to interpret its own
common law and public trust doctrine, the circumstances under which
the public trust doctrine can be utilized as a ―background principle‖ of
property law under Lucas, and the viability of beach nourishment as a
tool used by coastal communities to address coastal erosion exacerbated
by climate change and sea level rise.

121

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 129 S. Ct. 2792 (2009).
Oral argument was held on December 2, 2009. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., v. Fla.
Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., No. 08-1151, 2009 WL 4323938 (Dec. 2, 2009). The U.S. Supreme Court‘s
decision was rendered after this Article went to press.
123
Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 2008).
124
Id. at 1106.
125
Id. at 1105.
126
Id. at 1120.
127
Id. at 1111 (citing Ferry Pass Inspectors‘ & Shippers‘ Ass‘n v. White‘s River Inspectors‘
& Shippers‘ Ass‘n, 48 So. 643, 645 (Fla. 1909).
128
Id. at 1118-1119.
122
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VI. SEA LEVEL RISE AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Under the Submerged Lands Act,129 states hold title to navigable
waters, tidelands (to mean high tide), and submerged lands (generally to
three miles offshore, except in the Gulf Coast of Florida and Texas).130
The Act codified the general common law principle that ―[t]he state
owns all tidelands below the ordinary high water mark, and holds such
lands in trust for the public . . .‖131 As noted earlier, notwithstanding this
grant under the Submerged Lands Act, five states allow private
ownership to the mean low water mark: Maine, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Delaware and Virginia.132
California is not a ―low tide‖ state, so public ownership extends to
the mean high tide line. In San Francisco Bay, the McAteer-Petris Act
grants regulatory jurisdiction to BCDC over ―all areas that are subject to
tidal action‖ to mean high tide,133 and areas within the ―shoreline band‖
(100 feet landward of the mean high tide line).134 Therefore, BCDC
jurisdiction moves landward as sea level rises.135 California courts
recognized that BCDC jurisdiction was ambulatory in 1994: ―If the sea
level does rise [due to global warming], so will the level of mean high
tide. BCDC‘s jurisdictional limit might in the future move marginally

129

43 U.S.C.A. § 1301 et seq. (Westlaw 2010).
43 U.S.C.A. § 1301(a)(1)-(3), (b). The Submerged Lands Act resolved a dispute between
California and the federal government over the right to lease offshore waters for oil and gas wells
that resulted in a Supreme Court ruling that the federal government had paramount rights and power
over the three-mile territorial sea. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 22-23 (1947). The Act
relinquished title to the three-mile territorial sea to the states and allowed a state ownership rights
beyond three miles if so provided by its constitution or laws prior to the time the state joined the
Union (under the so-called ―equal-footing‖ doctrine). 43 U.S.C.A. § 1312. Only Texas and the West
Coast of Florida have secured ownership rights beyond three miles under these provisions (to three
marine leagues or approximately ten miles), although many other states have made claims.
131
See Lechuza Villas W. v. Cal. Coastal Comm‘n, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 410 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997). The Submerged Lands Act resolved disputes over jurisdiction of the open ocean, not state
ownership of tidelands. See, e.g., Oregon ex rel. State Land Board. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,
429 U.S. 363, 370, 372-74 (1977); People v. Cal. Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 584 (Cal. 1913); City of
Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 521 (Cal. 1980); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 379
n.5 (Cal. 1971).
132
Vestal, supra note 28, at 26 n.87.
133
Littoral Dev. Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm‘n, 24 Cal. App. 4th
1050, 1057 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
134
CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66610(a),(b) (Westlaw 2010). BCDC also has jurisdiction over
certain specified waterways and marshlands lying up to five feet above mean sea level. CAL. GOV‘T
CODE § 66610(a).
135
BCDC‘s jurisdiction is different from that of its sister coastal management agency, the
California Coastal Commission, whose jurisdiction is geographically prescribed in different areas
along the California coast. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30103(a) (California Coastal Act).
130
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landward.‖136 It now appears that over the next century sea levels may
rise far more than ―marginally.‖ Nevertheless, BCDC‘s jurisdiction will
advance with the mean high tide line regardless of the ownership of
tidelands and submerged lands.137
Both the mean high tide line and the public trust doctrine are
ambulatory.138 Therefore, rising sea levels advance not only agency
jurisdiction but also public trust rights over newly submerged lands.139
Thus, the inundation of private lands brings the public trust to bear on
such lands to mean high water, unless specifically terminated.140 The

136
Littoral Dev. Co., 24 Cal. App. 4th at 1066 n.5 (emphasis added). The court held that
BCDC‘s Bay jurisdiction extends to the mean high tide line, but not to the line of highest tidal
action. Id. at 1066.
137
Id. at 1066. The issue of ownership of tidal and submerged lands is more complicated.
Under common law, the gradual natural ―erosion‖ (or loss) of the shoreline or banks of navigable
waters reduces riparian ownership rights, whereas gradual natural ―accretion‖ (or gain) of shoreline
(called ―reliction‖ when the sea recedes) increases riparian ownership rights. City of Los Angeles v.
Anderson, 206 Cal. 662, 666-68 (1929); see also City of Oakland v. Buteau, 180 Cal. 83, 87 (Cal.
1919); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1014 (Westlaw 2010). However, artificial erosion in California, such as
where a public works project interrupts the flow of sand transport along the coast, results in loss to
the beachfront property owner. See Miramar Co. v. City of Santa Barbara, 23 Cal. 2d 170, 176 (Cal.
1943). Likewise, artificial or man-made accretion does not accrue to littoral or riparian property
owners. See State ex rel. State Lands Comm‘n v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 4th 50, 71-2 (Cal. 1995);
see also California ex rel. State Lands Comm‘n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 277 (1982). On the
other hand, under common law, violent or sudden changes in the shoreline from ―avulsion,‖ either
loss or gain, generally do not affect property rights. See Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738,
748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951).
138
See Lechuza Villas W. v. Cal. Coastal Comm‘n, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
Under common law ―[t]he state owns all tidelands below the ordinary high water mark and holds
such lands in trust for the public . . . [and] as the land along a body of water gradually builds up or
erodes, the ordinary high water mark necessarily moves, and thus the mark or line of mean high tide,
i.e., the legal boundary, also moves.‖ Id. at 411.
139
James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion and the Takings Clause: How To Save
Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279, 1368 (1998). (―As
shorelines erode, the public trust doctrine follows the eroding shoreline.‖).
140
See Lechuza, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 417 (―Such navigable waters are public ways for the
purposes of navigation and transportation of products, and are held in trust by the state for the
benefit of the public‘s recreational use as well, even when the underlying land is privately owned.‖).
(emphasis added; citations omitted)). ―The Constitution and the decisions applying it make it
abundantly clear that [a private party‘s] ownership interest in the land underlying [navigable waters]
. . . could not encompass any interest in the waters themselves which would interfere with the public
trust.‖ Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. App. 3d 253, 257-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983),
overruled on other grounds, Hubbard v. Brown, 50 Cal. 3d 189, 197 (Cal. 1990). ―Although, where
the shore recedes as the result of avulsion, the boundary of the littoral proprietor may not change, the
public has the same right of passage over the new foreshore as it had over the old—else an avulsion
might cut off the public right of passage altogether.‖ People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 143 N.Y.S.
503, 509 (1913), aff’d, 151 N.Y.S. 157 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914), modified on other grounds, 218 N.Y.
459 (1916). An exception may exist for temporarily flooded private lands under California Harbor
and Navigation Code section 100 where public rights may be limited to a recreational and
navigational easement over navigable waters above the mean high tide line. CAL. HARB. & NAV.
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termination of public trust rights is not granted lightly and must be
clearly expressed by the Legislature, courts or government agency with
delegated authority over trust lands.141 Therefore, inundated private lands
are likely to be subject to the public trust doctrine and the preservation of
trust uses, and development that harms trust uses on such lands could be
denied,142 if denial is supported by appropriate statutory and regulatory
authority.143
Another artifact of sea level rise undoubtedly will be an increase in
the construction of sea walls and other shoreline protection devices.
Since shoreline protection stops water levels and the mean high tide line
from advancing landward, it could also prevent the landward movement
of the public trust. However, a recent federal-court ruling in United
States v. Milner held that the mean high tide line is measured in its
unobstructed state as if shoreline protection did not exist.144 Milner cited
as authority the seminal case of Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke,145 in which
the Ninth Circuit held that navigable waters of the United States, as used
in the River and Harbors Act, extend to all places covered by the ebb and
flow of the tide to the mean high water mark in its unobstructed, natural
state.146 Therefore, the mean high tide line under certain federal laws is
measured in its natural and unobstructed state.147
In Milner, littoral property owners erected shoreline protection on
the dry sandy portion of their property that intersected the mean high tide
line when the beach eroded.148 As trustees for the Lummi Nation, the
federal government brought claims against the property owners for
trespass and violations of the Rivers and Harbors Act and Clean Water
Act.149 The court held that while littoral owners ―cannot be faulted for
wanting to prevent their land from eroding away, we conclude that
CODE § 100 (Westlaw 2010); see also People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1044-51
(Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (public trust inheres in navigable waters over submerged lands owned in fee by
private parties); Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) (suggesting right
to reclaim).
141
See People v. Cal. Fish Co., 166 Cal 576, 586, 591-92 (Cal. 1913).
142
See Caldwell & Segall, supra note 13, at 554.
143
Informal Advice from California Department of Justice, supra note 77, at 4, 15, 41, 48.
144
United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1197 (9th Cir. 2009). A petition for a writ of
certiorari for Milner was being reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court when this Article went to press.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sharp v. United States (No. 09-820).
145
Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978).
146
Id. at 753.
147
Milner, 583 F.3d at 1181 (―Under federal law, the upper boundary of any tidelands is the
mean high water (MHW) line, which is determined by projecting onto the shore the average of all
high tides over a period of 18.6 years.‖).
148
Id. at 1181.
149
Id. at 1180.
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because both the upland and tideland owner have a vested right to gains
from the ambulation of the boundary,‖ the littoral owners cannot
permanently fix the property boundary.150 The court reasoned that, ―an
owner of riparian or littoral property must accept that the property
boundary is ambulatory, subject to gradual loss or gain depending on the
whims of the sea.‖151 Consequently, the mean high tide line should be
measured as if the shoreline protection did not exist for purposes of
trespass and the Rivers and Harbors Act (but not the Clean Water Act).152
Leslie Salt and Milner interpret federal law and therefore do not
address the question of whether state jurisdiction and authority are
subject to a similar rule. However, littoral and tideland owners in
California may have statutory and common law rights to accretion and
erosion.153 Since California courts have held that the mean high tide line
is ambulatory,154 it could be argued under the rationale in Milner that
shoreline protection that fixes the mean high tide line extinguishes the
public‘s right to erosion and constitutes a trespass upon public trust
lands. Moreover, it could also be argued that shoreline protection
obstructs public trust rights to navigation, public access, and recreation,
and that measuring the mean high tide line as if the shoreline protection
did not exist would preserve those rights.155 Finally, California‘s
150

Id. at 1187.
Id. at 1186; see also County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 68-69 (1874).
152
Milner did not find that a violation of the Clean Water Act occurred, because the Act was
intended to restore and maintain the integrity of the nation‘s waters by limiting the discharge of
pollutants into the waters of the United States. United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1194 (9th
Cir. 2009); see also 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (Westlaw 2010). Since the defendant‘s bulkhead was
constructed on dry land, there was never any discharge of materials into the waters of the United
States, and thus the court held there was no violation of the Clean Water Act. Milner, 583 F.3d at
1195.
153
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1014 (Westlaw 2010) (―Where, from natural causes, land forms by
imperceptible degrees upon the bank of a river or stream, navigable or not navigable, either by
accumulation of material or by the recession of the stream, such land belongs to the owner of the
bank, subject to any existing right of way over the bank.‖); Curtis v. Upton, 175 Cal. 322, 334 (Cal.
1917); Strand Improvement Co. v. City of Long Beach, 173 Cal. 765, 772-73 (Cal. 1916); Carpenter
v. City of Santa Monica, 63 Cal. App. 2d 772, 788 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944).
154
See, e.g., Lechuza Villas W. v. Cal. Coastal Comm‘n, 60 Cal. App.4th 218, 239 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997); see also City of Oakland v. Buteau, 180 Cal. 83, 87 (Cal. 1919).
155
See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (―The public uses to which tidelands
are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs. . . . There is a growing
public recognition that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands--a use encompassed
within the tidelands trust-is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may
serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food
and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.
. . . ‗(T)he state in its proper administration of the trust may find it necessary or advisable to cut off
certain tidelands from water access and render them useless for trust purposes.‖) (quoting City of
Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482 (Cal. 1970)).
151
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artificial-accretion rule holds that an upland or littoral property owner
does not gain alluvion from unnatural conditions,156 and California treats
common law rights to erosion and accretion similarly.157 Therefore, a
court could hold that artificial shoreline protection should not deprive the
public of rights to land that would be tidelands in its natural state.
As noted earlier, public trust uses in California and other states now
extend beyond fishing, navigation and commerce, to the protection of
recreation, wildlife, open space and the environment. Therefore, new
actions and strategies supported by the public trust doctrine may be
considered to address the impacts of climate change and sea level rise.
These strategies are examined below.
VII. USING THE PUBLIC TRUST TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE AND
SEA LEVEL RISE
A.

ENHANCING PERMIT AUTHORITY

Within San Francisco Bay and certain waterways,158 below mean
high tide, BCDC has considerable discretion and authority to address the
impacts of climate change and sea level rise. For example, projects
within the Bay and certain waterways must demonstrate that ―public
benefits . . . clearly exceed public detriment,‖ and no alternative upland
locations are available; that any Bay fill is the ―minimum necessary;‖
that harmful effects are ―minimized‖ on water quality and circulation, the
fertility of marshes, fish or wildlife resources, and ―other conditions
impacting the environment;‖ and that ―sound safety standards . . . afford
reasonable protection to persons and property against the hazards of
unstable geologic or soil conditions or of flood or storm waters.‖159
These provisions provide authority to mitigate a wide array of
impacts from climate change and sea level rise for projects located in the
Bay and below mean high tide. For example, BCDC could require
projects built on tidelands and submerged lands to be designed so they
are protected from rising sea levels; it could require dredging or Bay fill
to minimize impacts on climate change and sea level rise; and it could
require water-oriented uses to be designed to protect persons and
156
157

See State ex rel. State Lands Comm‘n v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.4th 50, 56 (Cal. 1995).
See, e.g., Carpenter v. City of Santa Monica, 63 Cal. App. 2d 772, 774 (Cal. Ct. App.

1944).
158
See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66610(e) (Westlaw 2010) (listing certain waterways, including
areas subject to tidal action and marshlands up to five feet above mean sea level.).
159
CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66605(a)-(e) (Westlaw 2010).
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property from flooding. Moreover, the public trust doctrine provides
additional support to protect recreation, navigation, commerce, open
space, and the environment from the impacts of climate change and sea
level-rise within the Bay.
However, projects within the 100-foot shoreline band pose
significantly greater challenges for BCDC. The McAteer-Petris Act
provides that a permit may be denied only if it ―fails to provide
maximum feasible public access, consistent with the proposed project, to
the bay and its shoreline.‖160 This limitation makes it difficult to require
projects to address impacts of sea level rise and climate change on
development within the shoreline band except to ensure that accessways
are constructed to accommodate projected sea level rise, require
alternative access if accessways are inundated, deny permits where
projected sea level rise would destroy or harm public access, or require
fees to mitigate impacts on public access. Moreover, because projects
located in the shoreline band are above mean high tide, they are
generally not subject to the public trust doctrine and must meet the
Lucas, Penn Central, Nollan, and Dolan takings tests if they are located
on private property.
To more effectively address the impacts of sea level rise and climate
change, agencies like BCDC with limited shoreline authority may need
to seek legislation either to expand their jurisdiction landward or increase
their land-use authority, or both. However, in urban bays and estuaries
with multiple local government jurisdictions, like San Francisco Bay,
expanding regional land-use authority in this way is especially
challenging politically.
To address this dilemma, BCDC is currently considering new Bay
Plan climate change policies to take sea level rise into account. The draft
policies would require the preparation of risk assessments based on the
100-year flood level, including future sea level rise.161 The draft policies
also direct BCDC to formulate a regional climate change adaptation
strategy with other regional, state and federal agencies, local
governments, and the general public to identify the areas around the Bay
that should be protected, areas where development should be removed,
and areas where sea level should be allowed to migrate inland.162 During
160
CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66632.4. The Commission can also deny a project that is inconsistent
with a priority use designation. CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66611.
161
WILL TRAVIS & JOSEPH LACLAIR, SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV.
COMM‘N, DRAFT STAFF REPORT AND REVISED PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATION FOR PROPOSED
BAY PLAN AMENDMENT 1-08 CONCERNING CLIMATE CHANGE 9 (October 1, 2009), available at
www.bcdc.ca.gov/proposed_bay_plan/bpa_1-08_cc_staff-rpt_11-05.pdf.
162
Id. at 9.
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the time it will take to develop such a regional strategy, the draft policies
propose that BCDC take a precautionary approach to planning and
regulating any new development in areas vulnerable to flooding.163
B.

MITIGATION FEES

When on-site mitigation is infeasible, and project denial is
inappropriate, offsite fee-based mitigation may be an attractive
alternative. As noted earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court‘s takings
jurisprudence focuses heightened scrutiny on government actions that
result in the ―physical occupation‖ of property (e.g., requiring the
dedication of public access on private property).164 Although California
courts recognize that the Takings Clause is especially protective against
physical occupation or invasion of private property,165 they also note that
government generally has greater leeway with respect to noninvasive
forms of land-use regulation, where the courts have for the most part
given greater deference to its power to impose broadly applicable fees,
whether in the form of taxes, assessments, user or development
166
fees.

Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the effect of
the Takings Clause on mitigation fees directly, generally fees are viewed
more favorably than land-use exactions because they do not result in a
physical occupation or eliminate the value of property.167 California
courts give agencies deference to impose fees, unless they are applied in
an ad hoc fashion and thus bear ―special potential for government
163

Id. at 11.
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm‘n, 483
U.S. 825 831, 831 (1987).
165
Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal. 4th 854, 875-76 (Cal. 1996).
166
Id. at 876. The court also stated that ―[f]ees of this nature may indeed be subject to a
lesser standard of judicial scrutiny than that formulated by the court in Nollan and Dolan because the
heightened risk of the ‗extortionate‘ use of the police power to exact unconstitutional conditions is
not present.‖ Id.
167
The Supreme Court has noted that ―we have not extended the rough-proportionality test of
Dolan beyond the special context of exactions-land-use decisions conditioning approval of
development on the dedication of property to public use.‖ City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999). In fact, the Nollan and Dolan heightened scrutiny does
not apply at all to monetary exactions in most jurisdictions. See Daniel J. Curtin & W. Andrew
Gowder, Exactions Update: When and How Do the Dolan/Nollan Rules Apply?, 35 URB. LAW. 729,
733-38 (2003); see, e.g., N. Ill. Home Builders Ass‘n v. County of DuPage, 649 N.E.2d 384, 388-89
(Ill. 1995); Home Builders Ass‘n v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 356 (Ohio 2000); Rogers
Mach., Inc. v. Washington County, 45 P.3d 966, 979-80 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); Benchmark Land Co.
v. City of Battle Ground, 14 P.3d 172, 175 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
164
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abuse.‖168 A vast array of fee-related actions have been upheld, including
school development fees,169 rent-control fees,170 fees on rents charged to
daily users rather than long-term residents,171 and in-lieu fees imposed by
the California Coastal Commission for the construction of sea walls.172
Fees assessed by a set or general formula are viewed more
favorably than fees that rely on government discretion or target a
particular individual. The California Supreme Court has noted that
―individualized fees warrant a type of review akin to the conditional
conveyances at issue in Nollan and Dolan.‖ Therefore, a regulatory
agency should ensure that an individual fee demonstrates ―a factually
sustainable proportionality between the effects of a proposed land use
and a given exaction.‖ 173
Generalized fees established by legislative mandate or formula
typically are subject to the more favorable Penn Central balancing
analysis174 and the reasonable relationship standard, because ministerial
actions based on a legislatively imposed general mandate are less subject
to abuse. In such a case, a government agency would need to show a
―reasonable relationship between the monetary exaction and the public
impact of the development,‖175 rather than satisfy the more rigorous and
particularized Nollan/Dolan nexus and rough proportionality tests.
Therefore, fee-based mitigation may be used to address impacts on
public access to take into account how such access may be affected by
climate change and sea level rise. Because set formula fees are viewed
more favorably than discretionary fees by the courts, a formula to
establish a fee could be considered to offset the impacts of seawalls or

168

San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 27 Cal. 4th 643, 672 (Cal. 2002).
The California Supreme Court articulated a very deferential standard, stating that only ―the arbitrary
and extortionate use of purported mitigation fees, even where legislatively mandated, will not pass
constitutional muster.‖ Id. at 671.
169
Loyola Marymount Univ. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1271 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999).
170
Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 4th 952, 974 (Cal. 1999).
171
San Remo Hotel, 27 Cal. 4th at 670-72.
172
Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Ass‘n v. Cal. Coastal Comm‘n, 163 Cal. App. 4th 215,
245 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
173
San Remo Hotel, 27 Cal. 4th at 666 (quoting Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal. 4th
854, 880 (Cal. 1996)). California courts are reluctant to categorize monetary fees as exactions under
Nollan and Dolan. Therefore, fees applied generally on a ministerial basis, and not ad hoc, are likely
to be subject to lower scrutiny and upheld. Fees must also bear a rational relationship to the
damaging effects of sea level rise on the Bay or public access. As long as fees are used to study or
address the effects of sea level rise on the Bay rather than to raise general revenue, these monetary
exactions are unlikely to be considered a taking under these cases.
174
See McClung v. City of Summer, 548 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2008).
175
Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal. 4th 854 (Cal. 1996).
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coastal armoring projects along the shoreline based upon its length,
location or height to mitigate or study the effects of climate change and
sea level rise (seawalls and coastal armoring are discussed in more detail
below). Legislation could specifically authorize the use of fees to address
sea level rise and climate change since legislatively imposed fees are
generally more favorably viewed.
C.

COASTAL ARMORING

Seawalls, revetments, and other shoreline protection devices along
the coast are often constructed to protect existing development and
public infrastructure. In San Francisco Bay, 66% of the shoreline is
already armored in some fashion.176 However, armoring in the wrong
location can have significant adverse impacts. It can impede public
access to and along the shore, destroy beaches and important habitat,
reduce sediment inputs, reduce shoreline resiliency, prevent the inland
migration of wetlands, increase erosion on adjacent properties, impede
the flood-control functions of natural systems, increase flooding in
unprotected areas, and visually impair coastal areas.177 For this reason,
many states have banned or restricted the construction of seawalls and
other coastal armoring devices, to protect beaches and other public trust
uses.178
176

Titus, supra note 139, at 1302.
See Caldwell & Segall, supra note 13, at 539-42 (―Californians have responded [to
increased erosion] by armoring their coast with defense structures; at present, at least 10.2 percent of
the state‘s Pacific coast is armored and a third of the Southern California coast sits behind some
armoring structure. . . . A fortified coast comes with major financial, social, and ecological costs.
These range from aesthetic losses to new barriers to public access to, critically, the physical losses of
the beaches themselves--both to large erosion control structures and, most importantly, to the ocean
as armoring leaves beaches unable to retreat before the rising sea. . . . [T]hese structures can also
directly occupy the beach; a rock revetment may cover thirty to forty feet of beach width, as it must
slope outward from the cliff top, typically at a 2:1 or 1.75:1 (horizontal to vertical) slope, replacing
public beach with a boulder field. Seawalls, however, will normally occupy much less beach area.
Armoring covers sandy beach that otherwise could be used for access and recreation. Armored walls
also diminish, or destroy altogether, coastal access. Rather than being able to scramble down bluffs
and dunes, beach-goers encounter vertical concrete walls or riprap fields, cutting them off from the
sand below.‖); Todd T. Cardiff, Conflicts in the California Coastal Act: Sand and Seawalls, 38 CAL.
W. L. REV. 255, 258-61 (2001) (shoreline armoring destroys the beach in three main ways:
occupation loss, passive erosion, and active erosion).
178
The California Coastal Act prohibits shoreline protective devices for new development and
requires new development to be designed so that it does not require the construction of armoring
devices. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30253(b) (Westlaw 2010). But it also allows shoreline protective
devices to protect existing development from erosion if designed to mitigate adverse impacts on
shoreline sand supply. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30235. Maine and North and South Carolina prohibit
seawalls and the construction of permanent erosion control devices on coastal dunes or areas
seaward of a setback line based upon erosion rates and sea level rise projections. Maine Coastal
177
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State laws banning or restricting seawalls and coastal armoring are
not considered takings if they do not eliminate all beneficial uses of the
property, or the seawalls are located on public trust lands.179 North
Carolina courts have found there is no legal basis for the premise that
―the protection of property from erosion is an essential right of property
owners,‖180 because erosion and migration are natural acts that may
divest owners of their property.181 Oregon has declared the dry sand areas
of their beaches to be protected by the public trust under the doctrine of
custom, precluding a riparian or littoral owner from asserting use of such
areas as a recognized, exclusive property right.182 Government actions
restricting seawall construction have also been upheld on other
grounds.183
States may also require mitigation fees for the construction of
seawalls, or require the creation of new wetland areas inland of levees
and armoring projects. Where these strategies require property owners to
dedicate portions of their property above mean high tide, they must meet
the Nollan/Dolan tests. They should also identify areas that need
protection, such as essential public and industrial infrastructure, highvalue commercial and residential development in flood-prone areas, and
important wetland habitat or low-lying marshes and saltponds that could
provide flood-control buffers. As noted earlier, strategies that involve

Sand Dunes Rules 38 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-AA (Westlaw 2010); see Maine Bureau of Land
& Water Quality, Sand Dune System rules, available at www.maine.gov/dep/blwq/docstand/
nrpapage.htm; S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290 (Westlaw 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-115.1
(Westlaw 2010). Rhode Island bans erosion control devices along its entire oceanfront to protect
public trust uses and allow wetlands and beaches to adapt to sea level rise. Rhode Island Coastal
Resources Management Program § 300.7(D)(1)(2008), available at www.crmc.ri.gov/reg
ulations.html. Oregon bans coastal armoring altogether. OR. ADMIN. R. 736-020-0010(6) (2005)
(barring all permits for shoreline armoring for all development built after Jan. 1, 1977).
179
See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 459-60 (Or. 1993). Oregon‘s law
banning armoring for shoreline development built after 1977 was upheld on the grounds that it did
not deny all economic use of the property. Id. at 460. See also Shell Island Homeowners Ass‘n, Inc.,
v. Tomlinson, 517 S.E.2d 406, 417-18 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (holding North Carolina‘s ban on
hardened structures constitutional).
180
Shell Island Homeowners Ass’n, 517 S.E.2d at 414.
181
Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 177 S.E.2d 513, 517 (N.C.
1970).
182
City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d at 456-57.
183
Scott v. City of Del Mar, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1296, 1305-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (armoring
that encroached on public lands was a nuisance); Barrie v. Cal. Coastal Comm‘n, 196 Cal. App. 3d
8, 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (no vested right to construct sea wall under an emergency permit);
Whaler‘s Vill. Club v. Cal. Coastal Comm‘n, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240, 261 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(Coastal Commission‘s conditions were reasonable); McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003) (ownership rights do not include the right to construct bulkheads on
public trust land, therefore no compensation due for the denial of permits).
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general or legislatively imposed fees are not subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.
Shoreline protection policies in San Francisco Bay are more
permissive than in many other coastal states, some of which ban the
construction of seawalls altogether.184 BCDC policies allow the
construction of seawalls and coastal armoring if ―necessary to protect the
shoreline from erosion,‖ and if ―properly designed and constructed.‖185
Nonstructural methods are required where feasible. The Bay Plan
provides that ―[a]long shorelines that support marsh vegetation or where
marsh establishment has a reasonable chance of success, the Commission
should require that the design of authorized protective projects include
provisions for establishing marsh and transitional upland vegetation as
part of the protective structure, wherever practicable.‖186
These policies were adopted twenty years ago, before the imminent
threat of sea level rise from global climate change became apparent.
Currently, shoreline protection devices constructed within the Bay
(below mean high tide, or below five feet above mean sea level in
marshlands) must be designed with sound safety standards able to
―afford reasonable protection . . . against . . . flood or storm waters.‖187
The Bay Plan also provides that ―structures on fill or near the shoreline
should have adequate flood protection including consideration of future
relative sea level rise as determined by competent engineers.‖188 These
provisions allow BCDC some discretion to require shoreline protective
devices constructed in the Bay to take into account projected sea level
rise. However, within the 100-foot shoreline band, BCDC‘s authority is
limited to deny a project only if it ―fails to provide maximum feasible
public access . . . to the bay and its shoreline.‖189
These policies make it difficult to prevent coastal armoring from
harming Bay resources or addressing impacts from climate change and
sea-level rise. Consequently, BCDC is currently considering new Bay
Plan policies that would limit new development that would require
structural shoreline protection for the life of the project, or that would not
be set back from the edge of the shore above the 100-year flood level,
taking into account future sea level rise for the expected life of the

184

See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, supra note 25, at 34.
186
Id. at 34-35.
187
CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66605(e) (Westlaw 2010).
188
SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, supra note 25, at 33.
189
CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66632.4 (Westlaw 2010).
185
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project.190 The draft policies would also require adverse impacts to
natural resources and public access from shoreline protection to be
avoided and mitigated or alternative access provided,191 that shoreline
protection prevent significant impediments to physical and visual public
access, and that shoreline protection be integrated with adjacent shoreline
protection measures.192 BCDC is likely to vote on these new policies
during the summer of 2010.
To further address adverse impacts to Bay resources from shoreline
protection, amendments to the McAteer-Petris Act could also be sought
to authorize the approval the shoreline protection only if necessary to
protect physical improvements, not to protect undeveloped or vacant
land. Similar provisions are currently provided in the California Coastal
Act.193 This would help preserve undeveloped properties that absorb
flood waters caused by sea level rise and reduce the need to protect
developed areas elsewhere. In-lieu fees could also be considered to
mitigate impacts of shoreline protection devices on public access or to
purchase comparable beach access or tidelands.194
D.

ROLLING EASEMENTS

The Texas Open Beaches Act authorizes the State of Texas to
enforce a pre-existing public easement over the dry sandy beach from the
mean high tide line to the first line of natural vegetation.195 This
easement expands and contracts – or ―rolls‖ – with the natural migration
of the beach vegetation line and therefore is called a ―rolling
easement.‖196 New construction on the beach is prohibited, and existing

190

TRAVIS & LACLAIR, supra note 161, at 11.
Id. at 15.
192
Id. at 14.
193
The California Coastal Act prohibits shoreline protective devices for new development and
requires new development to be designed so that it does not require the construction of armoring
devices. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30253(b) (Westlaw 2010). But it also allows shoreline protective
devices to protect existing development from erosion if designed to mitigate adverse impacts on
shoreline sand supply. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30235.
194
Such fees were upheld in Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Ass‘n v. Cal. Coastal
Comm‘n, 163 Cal. App.4th 215, 245 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
195
TEX. ANN. § 61.018(a-1),(a-2) (Westlaw 2010). The Act declares that it is public policy of
the State to secure ―the free and unrestricted right of ingress and egress to and from the state-owned
beaches bordering on the seaward shore of the Gulf of Mexico,‖ and to protect other beach areas in
which the public had independently acquired property rights under common law by prescription,
dedication, or continuous use by the public. Id. § 61.011(a).
196
See Titus, supra note 139, at 1313. The term ―rolling easement‖ refers to a ―broad
collection of arrangements under which human activities are required to yield the right of way to
naturally migrating shores.‖ Id.
191
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structures that encroach on public beaches due to erosion or storms may
be removed by petition.197
A beachfront property owner brought an action challenging the
constitutionality of the Open Beaches Act after being informed that her
house was on public property and subject to removal after Hurricane Rita
struck the Texas coast in 2005.198 The federal district court held that the
Act did not effect a taking because the claim was not ripe and, under
Texas common law, the public rolling easement over the dry sandy beach
was a background principle of property law that pre-existed and was
superior to the plaintiff‘s ownership rights.199 The Fifth Circuit
unanimously affirmed the district court‘s ruling on ripeness and
dismissed the takings claim, but split on the issue of ―unreasonable
seizure‖ of the plaintiff‘s property and certified a series of questions to
the Texas Supreme Court.200 In November 2009, the Texas Supreme
Court heard oral arguments to determine whether the state recognizes a
rolling easement under the Open Beaches Act or common law, and if so
whether a landowner is due compensation for a ―taking‖ of property by
imposition of the easement.201 During the same month, voters passed an
amendment to the Texas Constitution essentially incorporating the
Act.202 The Texas Supreme Court‘s ruling will impact the state‘s ability
to apply its public trust doctrine, and will determine the efficacy of
rolling easements to preserve common law public access rights and
protect beaches from storms and sea level rise induced by climate
change.
A rolling easement is possible in states like Texas with a common
law public easement above mean high tide.203 However, California and
many other states have no public easement over the dry sandy beach
above mean high tide, and such states will therefore need to seek other
strategies. These strategies could include requiring deed restrictions as
permit conditions to require applicants to remove structures that end up
197
See Feinman v. State, 717 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tex. App. 1986); Severance v. Patterson, 485
F. Supp. 2d 793, 796-97 (S. D. Tex. 2007).
198
Id. at 797.
199
Id. at 803-04. The court also held that the takings claim was not ripe because the state had
not taken any enforcement action against the property owner. Id. at 801.
200
Severance v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490, 504 (5th Cir. 2009).
201
Joint Answering Brief for Defendant-Appellees at xiii, Severance v. Patterson, No. 090387 (Tex. Sept. 4, 2009), available at www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/ebriefs//09/09038702.pdf.
202
See TEXAS. CONST. art. I, § 33(b) (Westlaw 2010).
203
New Jersey and Oregon common law also provide for public access to the dry sandy beach
above mean high tide. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass‘n, 471 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J.
1984); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 51-54 (N.J. 1972);
State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. 1969).
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on state property because of sea level rise, or to prevent activities that
interfere with public trust uses, such as blocking public access,
constructing sea walls, or damaging public trust resources such as
wetlands or marshes.204
E.

PRESERVING WETLANDS, MARSHES AND SALTPONDS

Wetlands, marshes, and saltponds will likely to play a critical role in
how bays and estuaries like San Francisco Bay respond to sea level rise
and climate change. Bay wetlands, including natural subtidal areas and
tidal marshes, as well as managed wetlands such as diked marshes,
saltponds, and agricultural baylands, absorb floodwaters, sequester
greenhouse gases, and trap sediments and pollutants.205 Wetlands also
can adapt to rising sea levels by migrating inland and continuing to
provide flood protection, and key habitat and feeding grounds for a wide
variety of aquatic and terrestrial species.206
Most of San Francisco Bay‘s wetlands vanished long ago, making
the conservation of remaining wetland areas even more critical.207
BCDC‘s jurisdiction over areas below mean high tide, certain
waterways, marshlands to five feet above mean sea level, and diked
saltponds and managed wetlands208 allows use of the public trust doctrine
to support its permit and regulatory actions within tidal wetlands below
mean high tide. However, in marshlands, salt ponds and managed
wetlands above mean high tide, the public trust doctrine can be used only
where necessary to protect trust resources.
As noted earlier, the public trust doctrine in California supports the
preservation of trust lands ―in their natural state, so that they may serve
as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as
environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life,

204

Titus, supra note 139, at 1313-14.
See SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, supra note 25, at 7.
206
Id.
207
The 200,000 original acres of tidal marsh in the Bay have been reduced to 40,000 acres,
and 6,000 miles of tidal channels have been reduced to 1,000. MICHAEL MONROE & PEGGY R.
OLOFSON, SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA WETLANDS ECOSYSTEM GOALS PROJECT, BAYLANDS
ECOSYSTEM HABITAT GOALS 1 (1999), available at www.sfei.org/sfbaygoals/docs/goals1999/final
031799/pdf/sfbaygoals031799.pdf.
208
CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66610(a)-(g) (Westlaw 2010). BCDC‘s authority over saltponds and
managed wetlands, diked off and used three years immediately preceding 1969, is prescribed by
CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66605(c)-(g); BCDC‘s authority over tidelands and submerged lands below
mean high tide, marshlands below mean sea level, and certain waterways is prescribed by CAL.
GOV‘T CODE § 66605(a)-(g).
205
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and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.‖209 The
trust can also be enforced by the public to protect wildlife not located on
trust lands,210 and can prevent uses on non-trust lands and non-navigable
waters if they harm navigable waters.211 However, BCDC and other state
agencies may not enforce the trust outside its statutory and regulatory
authority. Thus, for example, because BCDC lacks permit authority
landward of the 100-foot shoreline band, it cannot rely upon the public
trust doctrine to protect low-lying shoreline areas affected by sea level
rise outside its jurisdiction.
The Coastal Barrier Resources System (System) is another approach
that could be utilized to protect wetlands and marshes. The System was
created in 1982 to discourage development in hazardous coastal areas by
prohibiting federal flood insurance and other federal subsidies for new
development on coastal barrier islands vulnerable to flooding and
storms.212 The System was expanded to barrier islands and coastal
wetlands in the Florida Keys, Puerto Rico and the Great Lakes in
1990,213 and the Department of the Interior was directed to map and
recommend areas along the Pacific Coast for inclusion into the
System.214 However, this effort was never undertaken.215 Although the
System does not foreclose development, it removes federal incentives for
new development in vulnerable coastal areas. Expansion of the System to
the West Coast to include coastal wetlands and low-lying areas
vulnerable to sea level rise, and the adoption of a similar system under
state law, would help remove perverse market incentives for developing
flood-prone areas vulnerable to sea level rise and reduce the need for
regulatory measures that risk takings claims.
F.

IMPLEMENTING THE CZMA AND CEQA

BCDC and other state coastal management agencies may also use
the public trust doctrine to address sea level rise and climate change
issues under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). BCDC
209

Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (emphasis added).
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 595-96 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008).
211
Nat‘l Audubon Soc‘ty v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1983)
(―We conclude that the public trust doctrine, as recognized and developed in California decisions,
protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of nonnavigable tributaries.‖).
212
See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3501 (Westlaw 2010).
213
Elise Jones, The Coastal Barrier Resources Act: A Common Cents Approach to Coastal
Protection, 21 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1020-21 (1991).
214
See id. at 1039.
215
Id. at 1039-40 (1991).
210
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implements the San Francisco Bay Segment of the California Coastal
Management Program (CCMP) under the CZMA. This gives BCDC the
authority to determine if federal agency activities and federally-permitted
activities that affect the land and water uses or natural resources of the
Bay are conducted in a manner ―consistent‖ with the enforceable policies
of the CCMP.216 The enforceable policies of the CCMP include the
McAteer-Petris Act, Suisun Marsh Preservation Act, the Bay Plan, and
BCDC‘s other laws, regulations and policies.217 The Bay Plan requires
BCDC to assure that actions affecting trust lands are ―consistent with the
public trust needs for the area.‖218 Therefore, under the CZMA, BCDC
may require federal and federally-permitted activities that affect the Bay,
such as federal highways, airports, dredging, and levees, as well as EPA
discharge permits and Corps wetland permits, to be consistent with the
public trust doctrine. Similar authority applies to other state coastal
management programs.
BCDC also reviews projects under the California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA).219 Like many other state environmental impact
assessment laws, CEQA requires the identification and prevention of
significant environmental effects.220 A ―significant effect on the
environment‖ is defined as a ―substantial adverse change in the physical
conditions which exist in the area affected by the proposed project.‖221
Under CEQA, a lead agency prepares an Initial Study to determine
whether a project may have a significant effect on the environment.222 A
Negative Declaration is prepared if the lead agency determines a project
has no significant effects,223 and an Environmental Impact Report (EIR)
is prepared if the project will have a significant effect on the
environment.224
Once an EIR has been prepared and certified as complete, public
agencies must make certain findings pertaining to each significant
environmental effect identified in the EIR.225 An agency may require
modifications to the project to avoid or substantially lessen the

216

16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c).
SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, supra note 25, at 9.
218
Id. at 79.
219
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 11500 et seq. (Westlaw 2010) (CEQA Guidelines).
220
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15002(a)(1)-(3).
221
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15002(g).
222
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15002(k)(2).
223
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15070(a).
224
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15002(k)(3).
225
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15091(a).
217
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significant environmental impacts;226 it may find that the responsibility to
lessen a significant environmental impact lies with another public
agency;227 or it may find that specific economic, legal, social,
technological, or other considerations make it infeasible to mitigate the
significant effects of the project.228 If mitigation is deemed infeasible, the
lead agency writes a statement of overriding considerations explaining
why the economic, legal, social, technological, or other benefits
outweigh the unavoidable environmental risks.229 Once a finding is made
for each significant effect, an agency may approve the project.
The California Office of Planning and Research (OPR) recently
developed guidelines to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions under
CEQA.230 The new guidelines, among other things, require lead agencies
to quantify GHG emissions when determining significant impacts231 and
allow lead agencies to use thresholds of significance, developed by other
agencies, to determine when GHG emissions constitute a significant
effect.232
The guidelines also require cumulative impact analyses for GHG
emissions, allow general plans containing summaries of GHG projects to
be used for the analysis, and clarify what types of land-use plans may be
used when analyzing GHG emissions.233 These amendments to the
CEQA guidelines will play a critical role in a lead agency‘s review, and
also will help shape the policies of responsible agencies.
An agency like BCDC may prepare an environmental assessment or
EIR when it acts as the lead agency,234 or comment on an EIR when it is
a responsible agency.235 BCDC may also comment on the impacts of
226

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15091(a)(1).
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15091(a)(2).
228
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15091(a)(3).
229
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15093(a)-(c).
230
See CAL. NATURAL RES. AGENCY, ADOPTED TEXT OF THE CEQA GUIDELINE
AMENDMENTS (2009), available at http://ceres.ca.gov/ceqa/docs/Adopted_and_Transmitted_
Text_of_SB97_CEQA_Guidelines_Amendments.pdf. These amendments became effective on
March 18, 2010. Id.
231
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15064.4(a) (Westlaw 2010).
232
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15064.7(a), (c).
233
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15130(a), (d).
234
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 11520. BCDC is not required to prepare an EIR under CEQA
because it has a Certified Equivalent Program that considers comparable environmental
considerations as an EIR. To reduce delay and paperwork, BCDC is authorized to perform its
certified equivalent program in lieu of an EIR when it acts as a lead agency. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
21080.5(a) (Westlaw 2010).
235
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002.1(d) (Westlaw 2010). The California Department of Justice
has prepared a fact sheet listing various mitigation measures that can be implemented by local
agencies under CEQA. Cal. Attorney Gen.‘s Office, Addressing Climate Change at the Project Level
227
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federal actions on the Bay under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).236 Thus, CEQA and NEPA provide an opportunity to
recommend measures to mitigate impacts of state and federal actions on
public trust uses, including public access and the preservation of open
space and natural areas needed to protect the Bay against the impacts of
climate change and sea level rise.
G.

PURSUING COMMON LAW REMEDIES

Common law doctrines provide a number of affirmative remedies to
protect public trust uses in ways that can address the impacts of sea level
rise and climate change. Doctrines like dedication, custom and
prescription provide a legal mechanism to preserve public rights to
beaches or other areas traditionally used by the public. Privately owned
beaches and adjacent uplands that offer access to beaches may be
impliedly ―dedicated‖ for public use if members of the public use the
beaches or adjacent uplands for five years, as if they were public
recreation areas, without objection by the private owner.237 The common
law in some states also recognizes that the long and uninterrupted past
use of a beach above mean high tide can create a legally protected right
by ―custom‖ to continue to such use.238 Public rights may also be gained
by ―prescription,‖ if public use is open, notorious and continuous for a
statutory period of time.
Activities that endanger public life or health, obstruct the free use of
property, interfere with the enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully
obstruct the free passage or use of navigable waters also may constitute
public nuisances.239 For example, coastal armoring that encroaches on
public land has been held a public nuisance in California, justifying
removal without the payment of compensation.240 In Florida,

(2010), http://ag.ca.gov/globalwarming/pdf/GW_mitigation_measures.pdf. However some of these
measures are not within BCDC‘s statutory and regulatory authority.
236
43 U.S.C.A. § 4321 et seq. (Westlaw 2010).
237
See Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 38-41(Cal. 1970); County of Los Angeles v.
Berkeley, 605 P. 2d 381, 227 (Cal. 1980); City of Long Beach v. Daugherty, 142 Cal. Rptr. 593,
597 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
238
State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 677-78 (Or. 1969).
239
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (Westlaw 2010); see also People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 19
Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1050 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
240
Scott v. City of Del Mar, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1296, 1305-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). The court
held that the city‘s removal of the seawall did not constitute inverse condemnation because the
―Legislature has the power to declare certain uses of property a nuisance and such use thereupon
becomes a nuisance per se.‖ Id at 1305. In this case, the City declared that the obstruction of a public
right-of-way is an abatable nuisance. Id. at 1306.
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construction seaward of an established control line fifty feet from mean
high tide is prohibited as a public nuisance under the Beach and Shore
Preservation Act.241 Bulkheads or sea walls that flood adjacent properties
or cause public beaches to disappear may also be considered public
nuisances.242
As sea levels rise, development may encroach on public lands, harm
other properties, or impede the protection of bays and estuaries from the
effects of climate change. In proper cases, public agencies may be able
use their police powers to remove structures that constitute public
nuisances, or pursue other common law remedies to preserve open space,
protect habitat, and provide buffers to accommodate rising sea levels or
storm surge. In such cases, agencies may need to seek additional
legislative authority, or work with state attorneys general, state lands
commissions and other government agencies.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Government agencies like BCDC face a tremendous challenge to
address the impacts of climate change and sea level rise. The public
easement created by the public trust doctrine is not a panacea and does
not provide additional authority not already provided under existing
agency laws and policies.243 However, the trust can be used to support
decisions promoting public uses and preserving lands in their natural
state that might otherwise be held takings under the U. S. and state
Constitutions. The public trust doctrine can also support the
implementation of common law remedies to protect areas vulnerable to
sea level rise and to prevent activities that impede efforts to address the
impacts of climate change. Some of these actions can be implemented
under existing authority, but other actions may require new legislation,
regulatory authority or partnerships with other agencies and
organizations.

241

West‘s FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 161.052(1) (Westlaw 2010).
Titus, supra note 139, at 1372 note 392.
243
Informal Advice from California Department of Justice, supra note 77, at 26, 38.
242
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